Choice of the research topic, summary of previous research in the field
In the suburbs of Budapest and in the capital itself, the 2010s have witnessed a flat and gated community building boom 1 . Triggered by the Hungarian Government's policy to grant funds to families who would invest in building their own house or flat in a newly built house. This gave way to a real estate (/property/ tenement) take off similar to the late 1990s and early 2000s, widely known as the Hungarian build-a-gated-community-fever 2 .
Drawing to its close, my Sociology research thus gained substantial material due to the intense revival after the economic depression.
The way of living marketed by every detail in a home, conveying primarily the American Dream, gained popularity in Hungary in the 1990s, after a short decade of its coming into existence. Already it emerged in and around the capital. Investments in building gated communities peaked in the early and mid-2000s, then plummeted due to the [2008] [2009] world economic depression (Bajmóczy 2014 , Schuchmann 2015 . From the point of view of Sociology, reurbanization and suburbanization provide a framework for people's choice of this way of living. Since the depression profoundly / thoroughly impacted the real estate market, it is to be noted that one instance of this reshaping is the trend of divestitures from building suburban gated communities. Parallel to this, a trend of relocating from the suburbs into the capital slowly unfolded. To the sociologist, it seemed back then that Hungarian gated communities would be the primary material to research as representatives of the economic and social era. Furthermore, publications on suburbanization can be extensively relied on (Csanádi et. all., 2010; Gergely, 2013; Schuchmann, 2013) , due to the fact that they account for the considerable use of agglomeration territory for the building of gated communities.
My study aims to look into how the gated communities came into existence in the agglomeration around the capital, as well as their governance and their links to host settlement. More specifically, I analyse the organizations and the functioning of private urban governance which support the gated community way of life; identify the needs for which these are created; describe their role in facilitating relations of a gated community as a whole with the outer, local society. My point is that the catalog of services provided on a gated community facility, which are typically definitive for any gated community, come into exsistence because of the organization and the private urban governance Presumably, living in private urban governance, living in this type of establishment, may affect the shapes gated communities take and the roles gated communities play in fiscal governance, protection of interests, nurturing a community.
By analysing the above mentioned aspects, a catalog of gated communities may be outlined, types inherently defined on the basis of 1. services available on the site, 2. site governance forms, and 3. functioning within the larger community. My goal is to take Sociology a step further on the way to resolving the public good -private good dilemma.
Also, to provide fresh insights on the topic of dooming gated communities as spaces promoting segregation.
Research challenges which I, having read the literature, knew I would need to face, are as follows.
1. First, emerging Hungarian gated communities do not all have controlled entrance, common facilities and services accessed on the basis of ownership, and private urban governance --all of which constitute the international definition of a gated community (Cséfalvay, 2008) . Investors, city municipalities, and most of all, real estate buyers/owners could not resume their governance and functioning in a gated community, and could not proceed in any law or policy-governed manner.
2. Secondly, there is a definition challenge. Interpretations used by the economic, municipal and real estate owner stakeholders differ, and, similarly, in previous Hungarian research (Cséfalvay, 2008; Csizmady, 2008; Hegedüs, 2011 Upon reviewing international literature, a set of approaches can be listed as offering a valid explanation for the emergence of gated communities. Sociology brings to our attention the wealthy citizens' strive for seclusion (Lasch; 1995, Atkinson and Blandy, 2005) , the wish to avoid exposure to criminals (Low, 2003) , and a way to protect the interests of investors, municipalities, and real estate owners (McKenzie, 2003) . Social Economics (Cséfalvay, 2008; Foldvary, 2006) highlights the redistribution process of local public goods (Cséfalvay abd Webster, 2012 , James, 1987 , and club goods theory (Buchanan, 1965) .
The above set offers the possibility for testing their explanatory validity on Hungarian material.
The explanatory power of various theoretical approaches.
Research in the Hungarian area needs to take into account the peculiar circumstances in the country (Glasze, 2005; Le Goix and Callen, 2010; Cséfalvay and Webster, 2010) . Which takes us to the next question.
Identifying local and socio-economic conditions favouring emergence and popularity in Hungary.
Two types of gated communities are defined by their location. In the process of reurbanization, blocks of flats are built into a resident community in large cities. In the process of suburbanization, settlements on the suburban ring typically host gated communities comprising multiple family houses (McKenzie, 2003) . I examine the second type, including blocks of multiple flats. My study being a sociological one, the main goal is to analyse the effects on local society which arise due to the gated community being a new way of life for its residents, and to look into how this novel form of private urban governance impacts the distribution of local public goods, which in turn has locally measurable social effects.
Internationally, publications in the field account for segregation, seclusion, quitting redistribution originally motivated by solidarity, and assess the gated community phenomenon as inherently having negative social capital. Based on this, I need to proceed with:
3.1 Interpreting the effect on the municipality and on the social environment from the segregation -integration aspect.
The question of whether gated communities host social capital which is rather 'bonding' or rather 'bridging' implies the last step: 
Defining the research material
To aid the discepancy between my and the KSH definition, I collected and formed a database of gated communities. At the outset, my working definition was that the municipality and/or the investor should clearly identify the plot as such 3 . In the agglomeration of Budapest, there are 58 cities hosting altogether 150 real estate sites registered as 'gated communities'.lease find the full list in the Appendix).
The next focus was on existing organizations managed by gated communities. 48 gated communities have traces of organizations founded by the community. 21 gated communities have or had in the past their own NGOs, in some cases supported by a webbased discussion forum. 27 of the gated communitites have online discussion forums which provided material for documenting intracommunity relations between residents. Out of the 21 NGO-s, 18 legal entities were surveyed and interviewed, these are located in 15 cities.
Measurements
Quantitative as well as qualitative methodology was applied on the above mentioned statistical census data, the municipality documents and the material found via online discussion forums.
NGO and municipality leaders were interviewed. The number of interviews is: 18 NGO leader talks, plus 11 municipality talks. Results are thus based on the qualitative analysis of 31 interviews in total. Closed gated communities. Gated communities which display all the criteria of the international definition: surrounded by a wall or a fence; common space within the site is privately owned; offering a wide variety of goods and services; managed by a selfgoverning body which can be interpreted as private urban governance. Located at a large distance from city centres.
Virtually closed gated communities. All but one criteria are displayed in the gated communities in this category. For instance, surrounded by a fence, but common space within the site is owned by the municipality. Or, no fence, yet private territory is not guarded. Offering a wide variety of goods and services, managed by a self-governing body which can be interpreted as private urban governance.
Semi-closed gated communities. Gated communities separated in space from the host cities, operating surveillance cameras for entrance control. Infrastructure on their sites is managed by the municipality; offering a minimum variety of goods and services, while residents do share ownership to a certain level; their NGO-s operate in a way not fully resembling private urban governance.
Virtually open gated communities. These are located at a large distance from the city centres, which affects the residents' way of life and their participation in local social life.
Offering a minimum variety of goods and services, common space is owned by the municipality, their NGO-s operate in a way which is different from private urban governance.
Open gated communities. These sites are merely named 'gated communities'. They are located within the host city, there is no control of entrance, and no services for the residents. NGO-s managed in the area do not aim at self-governance.
The theory of club goods has explanatory power in the analysis of the emergence and the functioning of gated communities in Hungary.
The theory of club goods, proposed by Buchanan (1965) , accounts for the creation and the functioning of gated communities in Hungary (Cséfalvay 2008 :130) . Arguments are as follows.
-Local public goods are created and maintained here. Public goods on the gated community sites are: roads, parks, lighting, playgrounds, sites for sports, receptions, fences, gates, surveillance cameras, and some sites have equipment for events (stages, benches, tents). Common services are offered in relation to the listed goods. Hiring a receptionist, facility maintenance, and organizing waste collection. Closed gated communities offer the widest range of club goods. Open gated communities offer a minimal set of club goods.
-Public goods are funded and used equally by all members. Monthly collected funds are a must in a closed gated community. The private urban governance body plans the cost budget, controlled by the residents themselves. In some cases, cost budget planning can be challenging. Namely, in virtually closed gated communities, the residents' body is comprised of voluntary members. Residents may opt out from membership and not pay any monthly fees.
-Clubs have control of access of internal public goods. This applies only in closed gated communities. Control of access raises the variety of private goods offered. There are documented cases, however, of non-compliance to paying monthly fees (e.g. in Magdolna-völgy).
-Effectiveness in generating goods and service levels are higher in closed gated communities than in municipality-provided goods and services. This mirrors insights on clubs in the literature. Quality of infrastructure of the common space at the sites played an integral role in the marketing and (pre-)sales process. This is why the investors funded creating a higher quality semi-closed site than the surrounding area in the host city. Semi-closed site maintenance, later, was delegated to the municipality.
- Investors, I find, funded gated community building to gain profit. Newly assigned plots were bought at a low price, then marketed -without external control -and sold for higher prices than what the quality of the newly built sites would have normally allowed.
Municipalities extended their inhabitable territory at free will, and happily, with the prospect of quick revenues aiding their cash flow. In retrospect, this 'laissez faire' attitude (Szabó 2003 ) is proven to have been wrong: infrastructure should have been funded by not only municipality but the investors. Lack of municipal strategy in a population boom had its longitudinal cost effects. Provisions were suddenly insufficient, costs had to be born by the municipality otherwise unnecessary, original inhabitants faced new difficulties daily.
Social and political conflicts ensued. New residents, who generated demand, in turn were drawn by the natural surroundings, lower flat and house prices, high quality of living, and crime prevention. They opted for the public goods affordable to themselves.
Quality of infrastructure and local public goods offered implies the need for private urban governance. My study shows that private urban governance is found in closed gated communities. All the analysed closed gated communities had self-governing bodies.
Family home type gated communities (Mckenzie, 2006) or corporate-type gated communities (Glasze, 2005) are in Hungary the closed and semi-closed gated communities, displaying a level of private urban governance. Residents own their real estate (house, garden, or flat), while common space is owned by the self-governing entity.
This makes all residents own the site's events, issues, decisions. Organizational form is in all cases non-profit. Mostly unions, a few foundations. In four gated communities, an Ltd was operating alongside the non-profit organization, in charge of maintenance.
Choice of the non-profit organizational type was motivated by the following. Fewer requirements to be met, can be launched with a smaller amount of money than any forprofit organization type. Residents' unions are even more easy to launch and operate.
Apart from this, the non-profit operation makes room for the generated goods being The next most important factor in establishing social relations with the host communities is municipalities' attitude to the gated communities. Suburbanization policy of the municipality has shaped the quality of these relations from day one. Long-term planning cycle and a thought-out strategy provides for taking care of the new population, which then paves the way for mutually satisfactory relationships between the municipality and the private urban governance bodies. Dövényi-Kok-Kovács (1998) describe the above municipality attitudes as fully promoting or promoting. Land owned by the municipality is sold to investors with the provision that investors contribute to funding, and building infrastructure on the plot. The aim of integrating residents socially is planned in a longterm way. Accepting reclusion, municipalities expect closed gate community residents to take charge of their own decision-making and maintenance. Open gated communities are considered to be an integral part of the host city, and get all maintenance and infrastructure which are offered throughout the area.
In the Budapest agglomeration, unfortunately, fully promoting or promoting attitude is rarely documented. Limited promoting, indifference, and even hostility (Dövényi-KokKovács 1998) mixed with 'laissez faire' (Dövényi-Kok-Kovács 1998) To sum up, one can argue that the gated communities in Hungary do display types of social capital other than bridging. The assessment of social capital prevalent is not dominantly negative.
Creation of social capital, as my findings show, is not inevitable in gated communities.
Similarly, its manifestation in private urban governance is not prevalent in the Budapest agglomeration. In all five types of gated communities, resident participation comes never easy, and it is true that the personal involvement is the most powerful motivation in social can be linked to the system capital emerging in the gated community. There is always a cause, an event or a problem in the past due to which common action was necessary. With time, the more open than closed gated communities can decide to manage a non-profit organization. On the contrary, the closed gated community's common private ownership creates the need for an organization. In more open than closed type sites, the recurring cooperational events yielded system capital, coming from the connection between residents. This connection, in turn, reforms system capital into launching an organization.
In the life cycle of these organizations, I observed that, after reaching their interest protection or site development goals, a few were annulled. Most of them, however, were redefining their aim: to forge a community. This process is found in the work of Coleman, who postulated social organizations which can be 'privately owned'. In Coleman's descripition, the resident community's system connections (terminus) remain and even get enhanced from the point in time when the social organization becomes 'privately owned'. Lin (2001a:193) argues that 'resources embedded in society become social capital when, e.g. a person activates, that is, mobilizes one of their chain of connections to reach a goal, e.g. get employment'. Similarly, I argue that when gated communities' non-profit organizations make use of system capital found among the residents, only then are they mobilizing this resource, which finally becomes social capital. The social capital, thus emerging through reaching out, enables the creation of further goods and further common action, thereby lifting the quality of life at the site. Goods created in this process are club goods by definition: local public goods accessed and enjoyed by all members alike.
